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Abstract
Solutions for cooperative games with side-payments can be ma-
nipulated by merging a coalition of players into a single player, or,
conversely, splitting a player into a number of smaller players. This
paper establishes some (im-)possibility results concerning merging- or
splitting-proofness of core solutions of balanced and convex games.
JEL classication: C71, D23, D71.
Keywords: Cooperative games, Manipulation, Dutta-Ray solution.
1 Introduction
A cooperative game with side-payments species a set of players and a worth,
in monetary units, for each coalition. This worth can be interpreted as
Corresponding author: Lars Peter Østerdal, Department of Economics, Univer-
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the income, or surplus, that a coalition can obtain if it stands alone, i.e.
if it chooses not to cooperate with the other players. An allocation is a
distribution of the worth of the grand coalition, and a core allocation is an
allocation for which the worth of each coalition does not exceed its aggregate
income. A solution is a rule that, for each game, species an allocation.
A cooperative game with side-payments is a very summary representation
of an underlying game of conict. It is therefore essential for an analyst to
understand to what extend it matters how the player set itself is specied
from the data of the situation. In many applications of cooperative game
theory, players may represent groups of persons, for example labor unions
or nations, or they may be other economic variables of the situation, for
example factors of production or objectives of an economic project (Peleg
and Sudhölter, 2003), and there may be more than one way of xing the
variables of the game.
In other applications, players are persons who can exit (entry) the game
by handing over (receiving) their assets to (from) other players, or groups
of persons can merge and then jointly act as one decision unit, e.g. as a
household or a rm. Depending on the specics of the game and solution,
players may have incentives to merge, or to split themselves into smaller
units, i.e. the game itself may be subject to strategic manipulation.
Manipulation of solutions for cooperative game situations has been a
recurrent theme in the literature. In the context of bargaining problems,
Harsanyi (1977) discusses the joint-bargaining paradox of the Nash bargain-
ing solution. Harsanyi points out that if two players merge into a single
bargaining unit, they tend to weaken their bargaining position. In rationing
problems, interpreted for example as bankruptcy- or simple cost-sharing sit-
uations, conditions similar to the joint properties of merging- and splitting-
proofness have been used to characterize proportional allocation, see, e.g.,
Moulin (2002, Section 1.2) for a survey.
In the context of cooperative games with side-payments, Lehrer (1988) in-
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vestigates bilateral mergers, called amalgamations, where two players merge
into one player. Lehrer shows that for the Banzhaf value it is always prof-
itable to merge and he uses this condition for an axiomatic characterization.
Haviv (1995) uses some consistency with respect to consecutive mergers for
a characterization of the Shapley value. Derks and Tijs (2000) consider a
partition of the player set and study the game that evolves when the players
in each compartment of the partition merge into one player, and formulate a
set of conditions implying that a merger in a given compartment is protable.
Derks and Tijs assume that players are rewarded according to the Shapley
value.
Haller (1994) investigates collusion properties of the Shapley value, the
Banzhaf value and other probabilistic values for bilateral proxy- and associ-
ation agreements. Proxy agreements are similar to mergers (if disregarding
dummy players). An association agreement modies the games such that
if just one of the players in the association enters some coalition, then the
players contribution to its worth is as if all the players in the association were
entering. Segal (2003) also considers probabilistic values and gives conditions
for protable agreements under di¤erent types of integration.
The present paper examines whether (core) solutions can bemerging-proof
or, conversely, splitting-proof, and provides some impossibility and possibility
results in this direction. Section 2.1 considers balanced games, i.e. games
with a non-empty set of core allocations. An anonymous solution cannot
simultaneously be merging- and splitting-proof. Anonymous solutions can be
merging-proof or splitting-proof, but we show that then they cannot be core
solutions. Section 2.2 considers convex games, i.e. games where the incentives
for joining a coalition increase as the coalition grows (Shapley, 1971). We
show that the Dutta-Ray solution is, in fact, merging-proof, and we nd a
core solution which is splitting-proof on the class of strictly monotonic convex
games.
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1.1 Denitions
A cooperative game with side-payments is a pair (N; v); where N is a nite
set and v is a real-valued function dened on the subsets of N and v(;) = 0:
The elements of N are called players. To save on notation, we write v(i)
instead of v(fig); v(i; j) instead of v(fi; jg); and so on.
An element x of RN is called a payo¤ vector. For x 2 RN and S  N
we dene x(S) =
P
i2S xi and x(;) = 0: If x(N) = v(N) then x is called an
allocation. The core of a game (N; v) is the set C(N; v) = fx 2 RN jx(S) 
v(S) for all S  N and x(N) = v(N)g:
A game (N; v) is convex if v(S [ fig)   v(S)  v(T [ fig)   v(T ) for
all T  S  N; i =2 S, it is superadditive if v(S [ T )  v(T ) + v(S) for all
S; T  N; S \ T = ;, and (strictly) monotonic if v(S [ fig)  (>)v(S) for
all i and S  N; i =2 S (see, e.g., Peleg and Sudhölter, 2003).
A solution is a function  that for each game (N; v) assigns an allocation
in RN : We restrict attention to anonymous solutions. To be precise, let
(N; v) be a game with jN j = n, let  be a bijective correspondence from N
to f1; :::; ng, and dene a game v0 by v0((S)) = v(S) for all S  N . Then
we have i(N; v) = (i)(f1; :::; ng; v0) for all i 2 N .
For a game (N; v) and T  N we dene the T -merger game (NT ; vT )
as follows: NT =

T; figi2NnT
	
and vT (S) = v(S) for all S  NT , where
S =
figi2T ; figi2SnT	 if T 2 S and S = S otherwise. Note that T is a
coalition in (N; v) and a player in the T -merger game.
A solution  is merging-proof (splitting-proof) if for any game (N; v) and
any T -merger game (NT ; vT ); T  N; that T (NT ; vT )  ()
P
i2T i(N; v).
In words, a solution is merging-proof if the players in a coalition never have
incentives to merge and act as one player. Splitting-proofness says that
regardless of how a player can be split up into smaller units, the player will
never have an incentive to do that.1
1Put di¤erently, a solution is merging-proof if regardless of how a player is able to
divide herself into a group of smaller players, it is always protable. And a solution is
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2 Results
2.1 Balanced games
It is easily veried that if (N; v) is a balanced game and T  N , then (NT ; vT )
is balanced. Even if restricting attention to balanced games, the combination
of merging- and splitting-proofness is inconsistent with anonymity.
Proposition 1 On the class of balanced games, there exists no anonymous
merging- and splitting-proof solution.
Proof: By contradiction. Assume that  is an anonymous, merging- and split-
ting proof solution. Let (N; v) be a game withN = f1; 2; 3g, v(1) = v(2) = 1;
v(3) = 2; v(2; 3) = v(1; 3) = 3; v(1; 2) = 4; v(1; 2; 3) = 6. We claim that
1(N; v) = 2(N; v) = 3(N; v) = 2. For this, notice that by anonymity
1(N; v) = 2(N; v). Furthermore, consider a merger S = f1; 2g. The result-
ing game (fS; 3g; vS) is then dened by vS(S) = 4; vS(3) = 2; vS(S; 3) = 6:
By merging- and splitting-proofness S(fS; 3g; vS) = 1(N; v)+2(N; v): By
merging- and splitting-proofness and anonymity, for the game (f1; 2; 3g; w)
with w(1) = w(2) = w(3) = 2; w(i; j) = 4; w(1; 2; 3) = 6 we must have
1(f1; 2; 3g; w) + 2(f1; 2; 3g; w) = S(fS; 3g; vS) = 4 proving the claim.
Now, consider a merger T = f2; 3g. The resulting game (f1; Tg; vT ) is
then dened by vT (T ) = 3; vT (1) = 1; and vT (1; T ) = 6. We claim that
T (f1; Tg; vT ) = 184 and 1(f1; Tg; vT ) = 64 : For this, consider the game
(f1; 2; 3; 4g; q) with q(i) = 1, q(i; j) = 2; q(i; j; k) = 3 and q(f1; 2; 3; 4g) = 6.
By anonymity we have i(f1; 2; 3; 4g; q) = 64 for all i, and from merging- and
splitting-proofness our claim follows.
We have now obtained a contradiction, since for the game (N; v) the
merger T = f2; 3g strictly increases aggregate payo¤ for coalition members.

splitting-proof if it is always protable for any given coalition to merge.
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It it noteworthy that the proof of Proposition 1 involves only monotonic
convex games (and the impossibility applies therefore to this subfamily of
games).
There exist anonymous and merging-proof solutions (for example, the
equal split solution that divides v(N) equally among the players), and on the
class of superadditive balanced games we can nd anonymous and splitting-
proof solutions (for example, the solution that for a game (N; v) divides v(N)
between the players who have the highest single-player worth v(i)). However
such merging-proof or splitting-proof solutions cannot be core solutions.
Proposition 2 On the class of balanced games, an anonymous core solution
can neither be merging-proof nor splitting-proof.
Suppose that  is an anonymous merging-proof core solution. For N =
f1; 2; 3g dene v as follows. v(i) = 0 for all i, v(2; 3) = 0, v(1; 2) = v(1; 3) = 1
and v(1; 2; 3) = 1. Then C(N; v) = (1; 0; 0) and since  is a core solution we
accordingly have 1(N; v) = 1 and 2(N; v) = 3(N; v) = 0.
Now, for T = f2; 3g consider the T -merger game which is dened as
follows: NT = f1; Tg, vT (1) = vT (T ) = 0, and v(1; T ) = 1. By anonymity
we have 1(N
T ; vT ) = T (N
T ; vT ) = 1
2
; contradicting that  is merging-proof.
Next, suppose that  is an anonymous splitting-proof core solution. Let
NS = fS; 4g and dene the game vS as follows. vS(S) = vS(4) = 2 and
vS(N) = 5: By anonymity S(v
S; NS) = 4(v
S; NS) = 5
2
.
Suppose that by splitting the coalition S into three individual players
f1; 2; 3g, the game (N; v) is obtained with N = f1; 2; 3; 4g; v(1) = v(2) =
v(3) = 0, v(4) = 2 = v(1; 2) = v(2; 3) = v(1; 3) = 2; v(1; 4) = v(2; 4) =
v(3; 4) = 3; v(1; 2; 3) = 2, v (i; j; k) = 3 for any other three-player coalition,
and v(N) = 5. Since  is a core solution we must have i(N; v) = 1 for
i = 1; 2; 3, and 4(N; v) = 2 contradicting that the solution is splitting-proof.

6
We notice that the proof of Propositions 2 only involves monotonic su-
peradditive games.
2.2 Convex games
For the family of probabilistic values, Haller (1994, Corollary 3.3) gives su¢ -
cient conditions for which bilateral proxy agreements are always (un)protable.
The Shapley value does not satisfy these conditions, and core compatibility
was not addressed. Indeed, the Shapley value is neither merging-proof, nor
splitting-proof, not even on the class of on convex games, as showed in Ex-
ample 1 below. Note that bilateral merging-proofness (splitting-proofness)
does not necessarily imply merging-proofness (splitting-proofness).
Example 1 Let (N; v) be a convex game, where N = f1; 2; 3; 4g and v is
given by v (S) = 1 if jSj = 1, v (S) = 3 if jSj = 2, v (S) = 6 if jSj = 3 and
v (N) = 9. The Shapley value is Sh (N; v) = 1
4
(9; 9; 9; 9).2 Now for T =
f3; 4g consider the T -merger game where NT = f1; 2; Tg and vT takes the
following values: vT (1) = vT (2) = 1, vT (T ) = 3, vT (1; 2) = 3, vT (1; T ) =
vT (2; T ) = 6 and vT
 
NT

= 9. Then ShT
 
NT ; vT

= 14
3
> 9
2
: Thus the
merger of players 3 and 4 is protable.
Next, consider the game (N;w) whereN = f1; 2; 3g; w(S) = jSj if jSj < 3,
w(N) = a where a > 3. Then Shi (N;w) =
a
3
for all i. For T = f1; 2g; the
T -merger game wT is dened by NT = fT; 3g, wT (T ) = 2; wT (3) = 1 and
wT (NT ) = a. Then ShT
 
NT ; wT

= a+1
2
< 2a
3
; i.e. splitting T is protable.

Proposition 3 Let (N; v) be a convex game and T  N . Then the T-merger
game
 
NT ; vT

is convex.
2The Shapley value can be dened as
Shi (N; v) =
X
SN;S3i
(jSj   1)!(jN j   jSj)!
jN j! (v(S)  v(Snfig)):
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Proof: Let S; S1  NT = T; figi2NnT	. First, we claim that S \ S1 =
S \ S1: For this, consider a player i 2 NnT . Then i 2 S \ S1 if and only if
i 2 S and i 2 S1 if and only if i 2 S and i 2 S1. Further, consider the player
T in NT . Then figi2T 2 S \ S1 if and only if T 2 S and T 2 S1 if and only
if figi2T 2 S and figi2T 2 S1, which proves the claim.
Second, we claim that S [ S1 = S [S1; which is proved in a similar way:
Consider a player i 2 NnT . Then i 2 S [ S1 if and only if i 2 S or i 2 S1
if and only if i 2 S or i 2 S1. Further consider the player T in NT . Then
figi2T 2 S \ S1 if and only if T 2 S or T 2 S1 if and only if figi2T 2 S or
figi2T 2 S1, which proves the claim.
The game (NT ; vT ) is convex if
vT (S \ S1) + vT (S [ S1)  vT (S) + vT (S1) for all S; S1  NT ;
i.e. if
v(S \ S1) + v(S [ S1)  v(S) + v(S1) for all S; S1  NT : (1)
But since v(S \ S1) = v(S \S1) and v(S [ S1) = v(S [S1); (1) is equivalent
to
v(S \ S1) + v(S [ S1)  v(S) + v(S1) for all S; S1  NT ;
which is satised since (N; v) is convex and S; S1  N: 
For the core C(N; v) of a convex game (N; v), the set of Lorenz-maximal
elements L(N; v)  C(N; v) is, in fact, a singleton (Dutta and Ray, 1989).
Let DR(N; v) = L(N; v) denote the Dutta-Ray solution, which we dene on
the class of convex games. By Hardy et al. (1934, Theorem 108) if f : R! R
is strictly concave, then DR(N; v) is the maximizer of the additive symmetric
social welfare function
P
i2N f(xi) subject to the constraint x 2 C(N; v).
We shall prove that the Dutta-Ray solution is merging-proof. We make
use of a lemma which says that we can always go from one core allocation to
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another by a sequence of bilateral transfers for which the allocation following
each step is also in the core.3
Lemma 1 Let (N; v) be a convex game and x; y 2 C(N; v): Then there is
a transfer matrix   = fijgi;j2N of bilateral transfers leading from x to y;
and an ordering k(ij) of bilateral transfers in   such that after each bilateral
transfer the resulting allocation is in C(N; v). In fact, for any ordering r(i)
of receivers (payers) i, there is a transfer matrix   and a sequence of core
compatible bilateral transfers such that all payments to (from) the receivers
follow the sequence r(i), i.e. if r(i) < r(j) then all transfers to (from) player
i will be carried out before there are any payments to (from) player j.
Proof: Let x0; y0 2 C(N; v). Let P = fijx0i > y0ig; R = fijx0i < y0ig and
U = fijx0i = y0ig:
First, we claim that for an arbitrary player i in P , we can always nd
some player j in R such that the transfer of some amount 0 < "  minfx0i  
y0i; y
0
j   x0jg leads to a new allocation which is also in C(N ,v).
For this, consider a player i 2 P; and suppose to the contrary that there
is no player j in R for which there can be transferred some amount 0 <
"ij  minfx0i   y0i; y0j   x0jg from i to j (upholding the core constraints).
This means that for any j 2 R, there must be a zero-excess coalition Sj
at x0 (i.e. x0(Sj) = v(Sj)) for which i 2 Sj and j =2 Sj. By Shapley
(1971), the set of zero-excess coalitions is a ring (i.e. closed under union
and intersection). In particular, \j2RSj is a zeroexcess coalition. Since
i 2 \j2RSj and since \j2RSj has empty intersection with R; it contradicts
that y0 is a core allocation.
3Suppose that x; y 2 RN , and for some   0 and some i; j 2 N we have yi    = xi ,
yj + = xj and xk = yk for k 6= i; j:We then say that y is reached from x after a bilateral
transfer  from player i to j. A transfer matrix is a matrix   =

ij

i;j2N , where is ij a
bilateral transfer from i to j, satisfying the following conditions: if ij > 0 then ji = 0,
if there exists j such that ij > 0 then there exist no j
0 such that j0i > 0; and ii = 0
for all i. A player that is neither a payer nor a receiver is called una¤ected, so a transfer
matrix induces a tri-partition of N in payers, receivers, and una¤ected players. See also
Hougaard and Østerdal (2005).
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Second, we claim that for an arbitrary player j in R, we can always
nd some player i in P such that the transfer of some amount 0 < "ij 
minfx0i   y0i; y0j   x0jg is possible (upholding the core constraints).
For this, consider a player j 2 R, and suppose to the contrary that
there is no player i in P for which there can be transferred some amount
0 < "ij  minfxi   yi; yj   xjg from i to j. This means that for any i 2 P ,
there must be a zero-excess coalition Si at x0 for which i 2 Si and j =2 Si.
Since [i2PSi is then also a zero-excess coalition, P  [i2PSi and j =2 [i2PSi
it contradicts that y is a core allocation.
To complete the proof, we must show we can actually obtain y0 from x0
by a nite number of any such bilateral transfers. For this, we show that for
any x0; y0 2 C(N; v) and sets P and R as described, any player i 2 P can
transfer a total amount x0i y0i to players in R in at most jRj steps (upholding
the core constraint in each step). The argument for that any player j 2 R
can obtain a total amount of y0i   x0i from players in P in at most jP j steps
(upholding the core constraint in each step) is similar and omitted.
Consider therefore an arbitrary player i 2 P; and let 0 < mi  x0i   y0i
denote the supremum of the total amounts of payo¤ that can be transferred
from player i to (a subset of) players in R by an ordered (nite or countable
innite) sequence of core compatible bilateral transfers. Denote the nal
allocation obtained in the limit of such a sequence of bilateral transfers with
y00. First, we notice that the same nal allocation y00 can be obtained by
an ordered sequence of at most jRj transfers: Let 0  mij  mi denote
the supremum of the total amount transferred from i to j. Since C(N; v) is
a closed set, the allocation y00 is in the core. Further, we can transfer the
entire amounts mij from i to j in a arbitrary sequence of bilateral transfers
involving at most jRj step. Indeed, if the core constraint for a coalition S;
i 2 S; is violated after some step, then the nal allocation would also violate
this constraint for coalition S - a contradiction. Second, we notice that we
cannot have mi < x0i   y0i since y00 is in C(N; v), hence there must be an
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additional core-compatible bilateral transfer from i to some j player in R for
which y00j < y
0
j - a contradiction. 
Proposition 4 On the class of convex games, there exists a merging-proof
core solution: The Dutta-Ray solution is merging-proof.
Proof: Let (N; v) be a convex game and x = DR(N; v): Let T  N and
consider the T -merger game (NT ; vT ); and y = DR(NT ; vT ). We want to
show that x(T )  yT . For this shall argue that if x(T ) < yT , then x cannot
be the Dutta-Ray solution for the game (N; v) - a contradiction.
From x dene the following allocation ex in RNT : exT = x(T ) and exi = xi
for i 2 NTnT . Then ex 2 C(NT ; vT ): Indeed, for any coalition S  NT we
have ex(S) = x(S)  v(S) = vT (S).
We dene the following two sets of players in NT : P = fi 2 NTnT jyi <
xig and R = T [ fi 2 NTnT jyi > xig. Hence in C(NT ; vT ) we can obtain y
from ex by bilateral transfers from players in P to players in R. By Lemma
1, there exists a sequence of these bilateral transfers, such that after each
step in this sequence, the allocation obtained is in C(NT ; vT ) and the player
T rst begins to receive payo¤ from a subset P 0 of the players P when all
other players in R have obtained all their payo¤ (i.e. each player i 2 RnT
has received yi xi). Further, by Lemma 1, these bilateral transfers to T can
be made in an arbitrary sequence (upholding the core constraints). Hence
each of these transfer from players in P to T must increase social welfare
measured by
P
i2NT f .
Consider now the game (N; v) and C(N; v). Since exT  xi for all i 2 T;
for any player i in P 0 it follows that there is a (su¢ ciently small) amount
of payo¤ pi such that a bilateral transfer of pi from i to any player in T
increases social welfare measured by
P
i2N f . Since x = 
DR(N; v) any
such transfer must violate a core constraint. In particular, for an arbitrary
player i 2 P 0 and any player j in T there must be a zero-excess coalition
Sj at x such that i 2 Sj and j =2 Sj: Hence i 2 \j2TSj  NnT and
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\j2TSj is a zero-excess coalition, contradicting that y is in C(NT ; vT ) since
vT (\j2TSj) = v(\j2TSj) = x(\j2TSj) > y(\j2TSj): 
For the family of strictly monotonic convex games, splitting-proof core
solutions exist. Note that a convex game (N; v) is strictly monotonic if and
only if v(i) > 0 for all i 2 N .
Proposition 5 On the class of strictly monotonic convex games, there exists
an anonymous splitting-proof core solution.
Proof: We dene a core solution, called , and show that a merger is al-
ways protable; that is, for any (N; v) and any T  N then T (NT ; vT ) P
i2T 

i (N; v).
For any game (N; v), there is 1  k  jN j and a partition P1; :::; Pk of N ,
classifying players according to increasing contribution to the grand coalition,
i.e. for any 1  m  n  k, if i 2 Pm and j 2 Pn then v(N)   v(Nnfig) 
v(N)  v(Nnfjg).
Let  = (i; j; k; :::) be an ordering of the players such that i0 is listed
before j0 if there is m < n such that i0 2 Pm and j0 2 Pn: Let
p() = (v(i); v(ij)  v(i); v(ijk)  v(ij); :::)
be the partial marginal associated with . We then dene  to be the center
of gravity of the jP1j!jP2j!    jPkj! partial marginals that can be generated
by all such orderings , i.e.
(N; v) =
p(1) + p(2) + :::
jP1j!jP2j!    jPkj! ;
where 1; 2; :: are all possible orderings satisfying the condition described
above.
We claim that for any T  N , a T -merger is always protable for the
players in T . For this, note that by convexity and strict monotonicity, v(S) 
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v(Snfig)  v(i) > 0 for all S 3 i. Now consider a coalition T  N , and let
i be the highest possible partial marginal in (N; v) to player i taken over
all orderings  (i.e. the partial marginal when player i has the last possible
position in ). We then haveX
i2T
i (N; v) 
X
i2T
i:
However, for the T -merger game (NT ; vT ) we have
T (N
T ; vT ) 
X
i2T
i;
because every partial marginal for player T in (NT ; vT ); for which the players
are ordered according to increasing contributions to the grand coalition, is
greater than or equal to
P
i2T i, since v
T (NT ) v(NTnT ) > v(N) v(Nnfig)
for all i 2 T . 
3 Concluding remarks
It remains an open question whether there exists a splitting-proof core solu-
tion on the class of (not necessarily monotonic) convex games.
Merging-proofness of the Dutta-Ray solution appeared to be closely con-
nected to the dening property of this solution of selecting the most equal
allocation in the core. We conjecture that the Dutta-Ray solution is the only
merging-proof core solution on the class of convex games.
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